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as having sufficient discretion to evaluate such proof;16 appellate courts should only
interfere where there has been a clear abuse of discretion as where completely irrelevant testimony is the sole basis for the decision of the board17 In any event, even if
there were some doubt, in an ordinary court, as to the admissibility of the particular
hearsay evidence in question here, it is a highly questionable practice for an appellate
tribunal to reverse a decision of an administrative board admitting such evidence.
Execution-Installment Satisfaction of Judgment-Imprisonment for Debt[New York].-The defendant, a federal employee, was ordered to pay a judgment in
installments of $20 per month, in accordance with § 793 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which provided that "notwithstanding the [garnishment statutes] .... the
court may order the judgment debtor to pay to the judgment creditor ....in installments, such portion of his income, however or whenever earned or acquired, [as may
be just] after due regard [has been had] for the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his family, if dependent upon him, as well as any payments required
to be made by the judgment debtor to other creditors ..... The court may ....modify an order made under this section upon application of either party upon notice to
the other." The defendant earned $230 per month, had no children, no financial obligations, aside from $48 per month rent and other living expenses; the whereabouts of
his wife was unknown. Upon his refusal to pay, he was adjudged in contempt of court
and committed under §8oi.2 On appeal the defendant contended that such commitment
was a deprivation of due process and an interference with a federal instrumentality.
Held, § 793 is not unconstitutional, in absence of a showing that order directing payment was unreasonable, or made without regard to ability to pay. Reeves v. Crownshield.3
Section 793 was designed primarily to aid creditors.4 Prior to its enactment, approximately seventy-five per cent of money judgments in New York were never paid.s
Dependents v. Hunter, 9 3 Vt. 483, io8 Atl. 394 (1919) Connolly v. Industrial Accident Com.,
73 Cal. 405, i6o Pac. 239 (i916); see Ross, op. cit. supra note 13, especially p. 290.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 148, § 153. The provision is not as liberal and has received no

more liberal an interpretation than the statutes in other states: Chicago Packing Co. v. Ind.
Board, 282 BI. 497, n8 N.E. 727 (1918); Chicago and A. R.R. Co. v. Ind. Board, 247 Ill.
336,
113 N.E. 629 (I916).
x6 Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property i69 (1928); I Wigmore, op.
cit. supra note 9,§ 4(b) p. 28; see Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of the
Law 35 (1927); Henderson, Federal Trade Commission 64 (1924).
'7 See Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 5o Harv. L. Rev.
909, 922 (1937).

Cahil's N.Y. C.P.A. § 793 (6th ed., i93i), Laws of 1935, c. 63o.
Cahill's N.Y. C.P.A. § 8oi (6th ed., 1931), Laws of 1935, c. 63o; see § 793 as amended by
Laws of 1937, c. 586.
3 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E. (2d) 283 (1937), annotated ii A.L.R. 392.
4 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaroff, 157 Misc. 796, 797, 284 N.Y. Supp. 665, 666 (1936);
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E. (2d) 283 (1937).
s Compton & Co. v. Williams, 248 App. Div. 545, 547, 29o N.Y. Supp. 984, o86 (1936);
Survey of Litigation in New York, Johns Hopkins Univ. Inst. of Law (193I); Levien, The
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Garnishment, where available, was often ineffective since the New York garnishment
statute grants an exemption of ninety per cent of all wages above $12 per week, 6 and
hence court costs or sheriff's fees7 each time the debtor's wages became payable often
consumed the major portion, or all, of the small amount garnished. Another impediment to the collection of a money judgment was the postponement of payment to a
second or a third garnishor, since the first garnishment becomes a continuing levy on
the debtor's wages until the first creditor is satisfied. A third major impediment was
the complete immunity of public employees from garnishment. The garnishment
statutes were therefore supplemented8 by § 793 to effectuate increased collectibility of
judgments from debtors, who though in a position to pay, evaded their legal obligations. Court costs or sheriff's fees are minimized since the costs of the order requiring
the debtor to pay are the sole expenses involved. The second or third creditor can
now, under the flexible provisions of § 793, secure payment out of the exempt portion
of the debtor's income which is in excess of his reasonable maintenance requirements
without waiting for the satisfaction of the prior garnishment. Furthermore, the sanction of commitment enables the judgment creditor to proceed more effectively against
those debtors, as in the instant case, whose incomes are immune to garnishment. In
the absence of an express statute to the contrary,9 considerations of public policy-(i)
that the public service and the performance of government employment contracts
would otherwise be impaired, especially if the seeivice had not yet been performed, and
(2) that the government should not be subjected to the inconvenience that must follow from being made a garnishee-prohibit the garnishment of the compensation of
public employees1o It has been urged that the continued presence of an order to such
a debtor to pay installments of his future earnings runs counter to this policy in that
it would subject those earnings to his creditors, thus having presumably the same effect
indirectly that a salary garnishment would have directly.- However, this objection is
not tenable under the provisions of § 793, since the debtor's maintenance requirements are taken into consideration by the court in framing its order and, moreover,
none of the usual burdens of being a garnishee are imposed upon the government.
Moreover, this interpretation is in accord with the trend of public policy within the
last twelve years during which seventeen states have subjected the salaries of public
2
employees to garnishment process..
This procedure can and should operate also as a protection to the debtor. EmployCollection of Money Judgments, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 5oF (1934); Cohen, Collection of Money
Judgments in New York, 35 Col. L. Rev. 1007, i96 (1935).
6 Cahil's N.Y. C.P.A. § 684 (6th ed., i931).
7 Cahill's N.Y. C.P.A. § i558, subd. 7 (6th ed., 1931); Rialto Security Corp. v. Harrison,
ri9 Misc. 145, i96 N.Y. Supp. 93 (1922).
8See note 4, supra. Cf. The Colombian Institute v. Cregan, ii N.Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 87,
3 N.Y. St. Rep. 287 (i886).
9 See 22 A.L.R. 760 (r922).
zo Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. (U.S.) 20 (1846); see 56 A.L.R. 6oi, 602 (1927).

"McGrew v. McGrew, 38 F. (2d) 541 (Ct. App. Dist. Col. 1930), cert. denied, 281 U.S.
739 (xg3o) (distinguishable from principal case on facts; debtor earning $400 per month
ordered to pay $3oo per month installments).
- Lichtenstein, Garnishment of Public Employees, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 291 (1936).
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ees whose wages are garnished are usually discharged by employers since the inconvenience and the possibilities of liability in becoming a garnishee are great. Debtors are
thus rendered destitute or forced to seek discharge in bankruptcy. Under the procedure of § 793, however, the judgment against the employee need not come to the attention of his employer. Furthermore, this device of installment payment, with due regard to the reasonable maintenance requirements of the judgment debtor and his
family, is less severe than the garnishment provisions of most states which, although
allowing limited exemptions,1 3 omit considerations of the living requirements of each
individual debtor and his family. Under § 793, upon application of either party, the
court may modify its order upon notice to the other party. However, in order effectually to aid the debtor, the statute should be framed or interpreted to give the court discretion in providing for either garnishment or installment payment. The New York
interpretation, unfortunately, is to the contrary,X4 although the statute can be so interpreted. The importance of considering the maintenance requirements of the debtor
and his dependents is partially recognized in the proposed amendment to the garnishment act of Illinois permitting the court to determine, in accordance with this criterion, the proportion of the debtor's non-exempt earnings to be subjected to garnishment.s Section 4(a)(3) of the proposed act, however, imposes a statutory maximum
upon the amount which the court can thus exempt. Such limitation of the amendment, it is submitted, will defeat its purpose.
The lack of provision against imprisonment for debt in the New York constitution
leaves the due process clause as the only basis for questioning the constitutionality of
the statute. Unquestionably, there is no violation of due process in the rendition of
the judgment determining his indebtedness; nor is there a violation of due process in a
reasonable modification of the procedure used to enforce the judgment. Nor is a statutory subjection of a public employee's salary to the payment of his debts subject to the
objection that it is a diminution of his compensation. 6
In those states 7 which, unlike New York, have constitutional provisions against
imprisonment for debt, the decisive element s in determining when the prohibition has
been abrogated is whether the statute authorizing the commitment of the recalcitrant
debtor complies with the intent of the constitutional provision,--to protect the honest
13 E.g., Ill. Rev. Stats. c. 62, § 14 (State Bar Ass'n ed., 1937) ($20 per week to head of
family); Cahill's N.Y. C.P.A. §§ 684, 792 (6th ed., i931) (ninety per cent of all wages over $12
per week); Montana Rev. Code §§ 9429-9429.1 (i935); Mich. Compiled Laws § 16179 (I930).
14 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaroff,
'57Misc. 796, 284 N.Y. Supp. 665 (1936); Economy
Leases v. Bierman, i59 Misc. 367, 286 N.Y. Supp. 732 (1936). However, see Cahill's N.Y.
Municipal Court Code § 8i (b) (c), as amended by Laws of 1935, c. 828 (applying only to
municipal court of New York City).
is Report on Proposed Amendment to the Garnishment Act, 19 Chicago Bar Record 17
(1937).
16Hanson v. Hodge, 92 Wash. 425, 431, I59 Pac. 388, 390 (1916).
'7 See Index Digest of State Constitutions (N.Y. St. Const. Convention Comm. 19x5)
(Columbia University) 759-76o.
i8Myers v. Superior Ct., 46 Cal. App. 2o6, I89 Pac. 109 (1920); People v. La Mothe, 331 Ill.
351, 163 N.E. 6 (1928); Leonard v. State, 17o Ark. 41, 278 S.W. 654 (1926); Ex parte Oswald,
76 Cal App. 347, 244 Pac. 940 (1926).
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debtor who is unable to comply with the decree.9 Where the constitutional provision
excepts cases of fraud, the debtor who is able, but refuses to pay, has been deemed outside this constitutional protection.20 If the debtor's non-compliance with a decree under a statute similar to § 793 is due to his honest inability to pay and is not a wilful refusal, his imprisonment would then, and only then, be in violation of the constitutional
prohibition of imprisonment for debt.
In harmony with the increasing proportion of persons whose property consists of
wages and salaries2- is the growing trend toward the use of installment payments to
satisfy judgment creditors. Similar methods are found in Massachusetts,- England,23
and Nova Scotia,4 and during the World War, Congress used this device in the temporary Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.2s An analogous feature is the provision
for payment by installments included in alimony decrees, generally with due regard to
ability to pay.
Income Tax-Corporations-Interest Deduction and Hybrid Securities-[Federal].
-During the year 1929 the respondent corporation had "guaranteed stock" outstanding, which had been issued pursuant to the authority of the General Assembly of
Virginia.x The guaranteed dividends on this issue are made payable whether earned
or not, out of the general assets as well as out of the earnings. The holders share in
the profits in excess of the guaranteed return on a parity with the common shareholders, and like the common shareholders have full voting privileges. The "guaranteed stock" is made a first lien as to principal and "interest" on all the defendant's
assets, taking priority over both secured and unsecured creditors in case of default.
During 1929 the corporation paid to the holders of the "guaranteed stock" $34,835,
the amount of the guaranteed dividend. The corporation also paid to these holders
the sum of $25,213, the amount necessary to bring the payment up to 12% the rate
at which dividends were paid to the holders of common stock. The corporations
claimed both items as deductions for "interest paid" in computing its net income.
The Board of Tax Appeals2 disallowed the $25,2r3 deduction, holding that it occupied
the status of an ordinary dividend, but allowed the $34,835. The action of the Board
in allowing the $34,835 deduction was challenged by the Commissioner, and the sole
question presented on appeal was whether the $34,835 is interest on indebtedness
which is an authorized deduction in computing net income, or dividends on stock
193 Freeman, Executions pp. 2394-6 (3ded. 19oo);ExparteClarke, 2o N.J. Law 648 (1846);
41 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1928); 37 Yale L. J. 509 (1928).
20 Strode v. Broadwal, 36 Ill. 419 (i865); In re Jonas Concklin, 5 Ohio C.C. 78, 3 Ohio C.
Dec. 4o (i8go); Ex pare Clarke, 2o N.J. Law 648 (1846).
"r 1 Recent Social Trends in the United States (Report of the President's Research Com-
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* 33 B.T.A. 895 (1936).
25

